Navigating institutional complexity: the production of risk culture in the financial sector by Palermo, Tommaso et al.
  
Tommaso Palermo, Michael Power, Simon Ashby 
Navigating institutional complexity: the 
production of risk culture in the financial 
sector 
 
 
Article (Published version) 
(Refereed) 
 
Original citation: Palermo, Tommaso, Power, Michael and Ashby, Simon (2016) Navigating 
institutional complexity: the production of risk culture in the financial sector. Journal of Management 
Studies . ISSN 1467-6486 
 
DOI: 10.1111/joms.12241 
 
 
Reuse of this item is permitted through licensing under the Creative Commons: 
 
© 2016 The Authors  
CC BY 4.0 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/####/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: Month Year 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. 
Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or 
other copyright owners. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
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ABSTRACT Following the ﬁnancial crisis, ﬁnancial sector organizations faced increased
pressures to reform their ‘risk cultures’. In this paper, we argue that the emergence of
regulatory and managerial attention to risk culture is symptomatic of pressures to redeﬁne the
fundamental ends of ﬁnancial institutions and to rebalance the pre-crisis emphasis on a logic
of opportunity and risk-taking with a logic of precaution and risk control. Based on the
analysis of normative practitioner texts and on extended contact with regulators, advisers and
corporate actors in the UK ﬁnancial sector over four years, we show how this initial
complexity of ends is translated into uncertainty and conﬂict about the means through which
risk culture might become an object amenable to intervention. On this basis, we contribute to
the growing literature on ‘institutional complexity’ by showing how organizational actors
address conﬂicting pressures about both ends and means, and by discussing some key
implications of their simpliﬁcation strategies. Our analysis also contributes to recent studies of
‘means-ends decoupling’, showing how means, ends and the object of intervention itself – risk
culture – co-evolve as they are reconstructed by organizational actors via their everyday
practices.
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INTRODUCTION
Reaction to the ﬁnancial crisis of 2009 has focused to a large extent on the need to
improve the ‘risk culture’ of banks and other ﬁnancial organizations (e.g., CRO Forum,
2015; FSB, 2014, 2013; IIA, 2014; IIF, 2009; IRM, 2012). This policy emphasis on risk
culture reﬂects a post-crisis aspiration to rebalance two logics of risk-taking which exist
in tension with one another. One, which might be called a ‘logic of opportunity’, is
revealed in the history of innovation, risk-taking, business adventures and entrepreneuri-
alism (e.g., O’Malley, 2004). The other – a ‘logic of precaution’ – emphasizes control,
safety and risk avoidance and has a distinctive history within risk regulation and public
safety (e.g., Hutter, 2010). The relationship between these two logics reﬂects a duality
(opportunity vs. harm avoidance), which is inherent in the concept of risk itself (see
Power, 2014).
Seen in these terms the ﬁnancial crisis and the emergence of risk culture represent a
prima facie case of ‘institutional complexity’, whereby an event rearticulates social
expectations about the fundamental ends of ﬁnancial institutions and exerts normative
power in reorienting organizational practices (Greenwood et al., 2011; Thornton et al.,
2012). A growing body of actor-level accounts of responses to institutional complexity
(e.g., McPherson and Sauder, 2013; Smets and Jarzabkowski, 2013; Smets et al., 2015;
Smets et al., 2012; Voronov et al., 2013) would suggest that the logics of opportunity
and precaution, and the complexity deriving from their incompatible prescriptions
about organizational ends, become woven into the work of the actors who seek to
improve their organizations’ risk cultures.
As part of a longitudinal study of risk culture in ﬁnancial organizations operating in
the UK, we had the opportunity to explore what organizational actors do when they
confront such an emergent complexity of ends. Our initial analysis of data collected
through a review of normative guidance documents written for practitioners and
extended contact with regulators, advisers and corporate actors suggested that the com-
plexity of ends was also ampliﬁed by a tension between apparently incompatible ways to
deﬁne the means of intervention. In short, organizational actors seemed to navigate a
constellation of means-ends logics rather than responding directly to the shifting binary
logics of ends.
In the analysis which follows, we explore and explain how organizational actors navi-
gate complexity at the level of both ends and means and how they perceive and construct
their repertoire of responses. Our hunch is that, by exploring the dynamics of such a
means-ends constellation of logics, we can extend the literature on organizational
responses to institutional complexity in combination with recent studies that postulate
an increasingly opaque relationship between means and organizational ends (see
Bromley and Powell, 2012; Dick, 2015; Wijen, 2014).
To probe our hunch, we develop and appeal to the notion of workstream to emphasize
that our unit of analysis is a dynamic and most likely unstable ﬂow of organizational
activities that respond to, and mediate, means-ends complexity. Drawing on an exem-
plar workstream within our broad set of data, we analyse in detail the means through
which organizational actors respond to the complexity of ends and how means change
over time in relation to those ends. As part of our analysis, we inductively derive two
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logics of means – labelled ‘engineered’ and ‘organic’ – that capture distinctive patterns
underlying the selection of managerial practices, the theorization of risk culture and the
mobilization of organizational actors towards it. Subsequently, with the support of prior
literature as well as insights from our broader set of data, we develop a process model
which shows how logics of means and ends dynamically co-evolve as they are recon-
structed by organizational actors via their everyday practices.
The ﬁndings presented in this paper make two contributions. First, we extend work
on responses to institutional complexity (e.g., Greenwood et al., 2011; McPherson and
Sauder, 2013; Pache and Santos, 2010; Smets and Jarzabkowski, 2013; Smets et al.,
2015; Smets et al., 2012; Voronov et al., 2013), showing how pressures about both
ends and means are a key feature of the institutional complexity that organizational
actors must navigate. In developing our process model, we show how societal demands
to correct a risk culture skewed towards a logic of opportunity are translated into
uncertainty and conﬂict about the means through which risk culture is made into an
object that can be reformed. We also explain how organizational actors tend to gravi-
tate towards a speciﬁc logic of means (engineered) that helps to de-complexify the com-
plexity of both ends and means and restore a logic of opportunity. Finally, drawing in
part on Friedland’s (2012) recent critical engagement with the institutional logics per-
spective, we show how multiple logics are embodied in workstreams which are both
oriented to, and productive of, risk culture as a new object amenable to managerial
intervention.
Second, our longitudinal analysis of risk culture workstreams shows the co-formation
and continuous realignment of ends and means prescribed via multiple and conﬂicting
logics, rather than the decoupling postulated by Bromley and Powell (2012) and subse-
quently analysed by other scholars (Dick, 2015; Wijen, 2014). In our setting organiza-
tional actors struggle to stabilize both a balance between ends (opportunity vs.
precaution), which exist in an inherent tension, and also a balance of incompatible
means (engineered vs. organic). These two pairs of logics have a mutual inﬂuence on
each other. For example, the repositioning of risk culture workstreams within an engi-
neered logic, which was clearly predominant towards the end of our study, was made
possible both by a reframing of organizational ends to emphasize opportunity and risk-
taking, and also by the parallel difﬁculty of making an organic approach visible and
actionable. In short, the co-productive relation between means and ends in the ﬁeld of
risk culture is such that conﬂict and pressures about means have implications for ends
and vice versa.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section suggests how the emergence of
regulatory and managerial attention to risk culture is indicative of a distinctive kind of
institutional complexity. The third section elaborates on our theoretical reference points
– responses to institutional complexity and means-ends decoupling – which are com-
bined in the analysis of risk culture. The fourth section describes our research approach,
methodology and data sources. The ﬁfth section provides the detailed analysis of an
exemplar case and its risk culture workstream. The sixth section develops a model of
risk culture dynamics, iterating between the details of the speciﬁc case, previous litera-
ture and insights from our broader set of data. The ﬁnal section discusses the research
implications and some limitations of our study.
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INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY AND RISK CULTURE
Our starting point is that, as put by Munir (2011, p. 115), ‘the story of the crisis has
within it a rich tale of shifting logics’. Organizational actors face the ‘institutional com-
plexity’ (Greenwood et al., 2011) of incompatible prescriptions about the fundamental
ends, organizing principles and mechanisms of control in ﬁnancial institutions.
Several examples suggest a shift from a logic of opportunity praising innovative risk-
taking in a period of economic growth to a logic of precaution condemning excessive risk-
taking in a period of crisis. For example, the former Federal Reserve chairman admitted
he had been ‘partially wrong’ in his hands-off approach towards the banking industry
(Clark and Treanor, 2008). Financial innovation, once regarded positively, came to be
seen as problematic (Tett, 2009). Bold pre-crisis statements, such as the infamous
remark by Citigroup’s CEO – ‘as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and
dance’ – were used as reminders of how the reckless pursuit of proﬁt can destabilize an
entire society (Munir, 2011).
In this changed post-crisis context, from 2009 onwards companies, advisers and regu-
lators began to talk of ‘risk culture’ as part of their diagnostic vocabulary (e.g., CRO
Forum, 2015; Deloitte, 2015; EY, 2014, 2015; FSB, 2014, 2013; IIA, 2014; IIF, 2009;
IRM, 2012). Reﬂecting an apparent climate of moral panic about banking and bankers,
risk culture emerged as a dominant frame for the problem of balancing risk control and
risk-taking. Defective risk culture had the characteristics of a social problem (Hilgartner
and Bosk, 1988) requiring managerial and regulatory intervention. ‘Bad’ risk culture
could also be seen as a kind of policy ‘risk object’ (Hilgartner, 1992) in which ‘excessive’
and ‘reckless’ risk-taking had damaged whole societies. As put by the Institute of Inter-
national Finance[1] (IIF) in 2009:
‘Many discussions of the crisis have explored how ﬁrms’ varying risk cultures have
strongly affected their response to the building up of risk before the onset of market
turmoil, or to the strains of coping with the crisis, or both’. (IIF, 2009, Appendix
III, p. 1)
Whereas the ‘building up of risk’ mentioned here might have been seen as an opportu-
nity before the crisis, it was subsequently reframed as danger and harm, partly reﬂecting
the inherent complexity of the term ‘risk’ itself (Power, 2014). From this high level point
of view, the ‘excessive risk-taking’ (House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2009) that
caused the ﬁnancial crisis arose from a risk culture skewed towards the logic opportunity
and was urgently in need of correction.
Post-crisis commentaries and regulatory documents also provide conﬂicting prescrip-
tions about the means through which risk culture can be acted upon in speciﬁc organiza-
tional settings. On the one hand, the theme of culture attracts non-reductive and
interactive understandings of behavior and ethics as drivers of risk (see Willman, 2014,
Ch. 9). As put by a senior regulator, regulators should be able to ‘draw conclusions
about culture from what we observe about a ﬁrm – in other words, joining the dots
rather than assessing culture directly’ (Adamson, 2013). This approach suggests that risk
culture is revealed through sense-making across disparate activities such as: how a ﬁrm
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deals with regulatory issues; customer experience at the point of sale; considerations
around product approval processes; information escalation processes; remuneration
structures and incentives.
On the other hand, there are also pressures to adopt less idiosyncratic and more
standardized and auditable management processes (Meyer, 2002; Power, 1997). As put
in a consultation document of the Financial Stability Board[2] (FSB) in 2013:
‘Supervisors should also seek supporting evidence regarding how a ﬁrm systematically
assesses risk culture including the processes used (e.g. employee surveys, independ-
ent reviews, internal reporting) and action plans to address ﬁndings on matters that
may come to their attention’. (FSB, 2013, p. 4, emphasis added)
To summarise, our preliminary review of practitioner articles and regulatory documents
suggests that the emergence of risk culture is characterized by a distinctive form of insti-
tutional complexity in which organizational actors must navigate both the complexity of
shifting ends (opportunity-precaution logics) and the complexity of the means through
which these ends can be operationalized. For this reason, as we explain below, our anal-
ysis of risk culture combines insights from work on organizational responses to institu-
tional complexity with studies that shed light on the potentially problematic relationship
between organizational ends and means.
POSITIONING THE STUDY OF RISK CULTURE
In their review of decoupling research and theory, Bromley and Powell (2012) argue
that modern organizations are more likely to experience gaps between practices and
organizational goals (means-ends decoupling) rather than symbolic compliance and
gaps between policies and practices (policy-practice decoupling). In other words, appa-
rently neutral managerial techniques and processes – like accounting (see Miller and
Power, 2013) – have an organizational and institutional life of their own which may
frustrate organizational ends, even where organizational actors aspire to realize policy
goals.
Recent studies shed further light on the conditions under which means-ends decou-
pling happens and persists over time. For example, in the context of socio-
environmental standards, Wijen (2014) argues that attempts to solve problems of
symbolic compliance (policy-practice decoupling) in opaque ﬁelds tend to increase
means-ends decoupling. This is because ‘compliance-inducement’ actions, such as the
creation of standard rules and practices, are likely to be partial and at odds with local
variety. And in a study of part time working in the police force, Dick (2015) argues that
means-ends decoupling persists because actors pragmatically balance problems related
to a practice (e.g., part time working increases efﬁciency problems) with the beneﬁts of
its latent function (e.g., preventing law suits).
The case of risk culture can be intuitively related to the literature on means-ends
decoupling. As shown in the previous section, there are pressures for the production of
demonstrable evidence about the efﬁcacy of reforms, and yet the very object of reform –
risk culture – is itself highly ambiguous. To date, however, relatively little is known
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about the precise dynamics of means-ends decoupling in speciﬁc organizational settings
(the study by Dick, 2015, constitutes an exception). Indeed, as Haack and Schoeneborn
(2015) suggest, further work is needed to explain the ideational dynamics involved in the
construction of both means and ends as objects of attention and orientation. Further-
more, there is a risk that work on means-ends decoupling can import an implicitly func-
tionalist view that a ‘deviation’ of means from the functional realization of ends reﬂects
the ‘bad’ implementation of clearly-deﬁned policies.
In our view, combining work on organizational responses to institutional complexity
with that of means-ends decoupling helps to avoid this normative trap and supports a
focus on how both ends and means are ambiguous, collective, inherently contested and,
crucially, subject to conﬂicting institutional demands (Pache and Santos, 2010). Speciﬁcally,
recent actor-level accounts of responses to institutional complexity (e.g., McPherson and
Sauder, 2013; Smets and Jarzabkowski, 2013; Smets et al., 2015; Smets et al., 2012;
Voronov et al., 2013) provide rich insights into the way in which multiple institutional
logics are represented and selectively enacted in speciﬁc organizational settings and
work situations.
A common theme is that organizational actors can pragmatically use and draw upon
different logics, or part of their underlying practices, in response to experienced institu-
tional complexity. For example, it has been shown that state attorneys, clinicians and
public defenders ﬂexibly use different logics to justify criminal sentences as they muddle
through speciﬁc drug court cases (McPherson and Sauder, 2013). Similarly lawyers
from a global law ﬁrm search for new ways of carrying out their tasks and foreground
and prioritize speciﬁc referent audiences (Smets and Jarzabkowski, 2013; Smets et al.,
2012). Representatives of the wine industry also selectively enact different scripts that
contribute to materialize either an aesthetic or market logic (Voronov et al., 2013). And
insurers proactively segment or recombine different logics depending on the speciﬁc
work situation, including the type of location and audience (Smets et al., 2015).
A practical implication of these studies is to show that the use and recombination of
existing logics, and their underlying practices, is both normal and consequential. For
example, McPherson and Sauder (2013) argue that speciﬁc uses of institutional logics
have important effects on court decisions. Smets and colleagues (2012) suggest that
organizational actors foreground and give voice to particular audiences, while they
silence others. In so doing, these actors engage in what can be called ‘simpliﬁcation
processes’ (Kostova et al., 2008, p. 1002), something which is also evident in our study
of risk culture.
This body of work on institutional complexity encourages the exploration of how
social interactions within organizations shape understandings of institutional complexity
and how organizational actors respond to conﬂicting prescriptions. Thornton and col-
leagues (2012, Ch. 6) suggest that important aspects of such intra-organizational dynam-
ics relate to the ‘problematization’ of existing practices as well as the ‘theorization’ of
new forms of collective mobilization and intervention via the speciﬁcation of abstract
categories and patterned cause-effect relations (see also Strang and Meyer, 1993). As we
see in the case of risk culture, such theorization efforts also apply to the collective object
of intervention itself – risk culture. Indeed, drawing in part on Friedland’s (2012) recent
critical engagement with the institutional logics perspective, we focus attention on how
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speciﬁc theorizations of risk culture as an object are at stake in, and entangled with, dif-
ferent logics.
Overall, the combination of the literature on means-ends decoupling and work on
organizational responses to institutional complexity provides the theoretical positioning
for our study of the dynamics of risk culture. The concept of means-ends decoupling
sensitizes the analysis to the potentially problematic relationship between the means of
intervention and intended organizational ends. The work on institutional complexity
supports our focus on the intra-organizational level and how organizational actors
respond to conﬂicting prescriptions. As an outcome of this combination of literatures,
we examine not only the means through which organizational actors respond to the
institutional complexity of different ends, but also how these means change over time in
relation to ends and, as we shall see, shape them.
This conceptual background requires the adoption of a longitudinal perspective to
the study of risk culture production in speciﬁc organizational sites. To underwrite the
processual nature of the study of risk culture, we posit the idea of the workstream as a pro-
visional theoretical construct. Workstreams are site-based, actor-rich units of analysis
within which responses to institutional complexity are visible and which change over
time in the way they draw on different logics of ends and means. In line with a means-
ends decoupling perspective, we expect to ﬁnd a range of activities oriented to risk
culture which may or may not become ‘practice’, namely ‘constellations of socially
meaningful activity that are relatively coherent and established’ (Thornton et al., 2012,
p. 128). As we shall see, risk culture workstreams seek to stabilize the construction of risk
culture through its practical operationalization, yet this ﬂow of work is dynamic and
unstable as it responds to the complexity of both means and ends.
RESEARCH APPROACH
This section describes our methodology, data sources, data analysis and presentation.
We approached the analysis of risk culture from the broad standpoint of interpretative
studies of accounting and management practices. These studies traditionally emphasize
‘thick’ analysis of how research subjects develop their own understandings and meanings
in relation to a unique phenomenon (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006). Our analysis was
also loosely informed by elements of critical realism (Danermark et al., 2002; Reed,
2005) in order to go beyond the observed experiences of ﬁeld actors and to address the
underlying dynamics that might explain patterns in the organizational trajectory of risk
culture workstreams.
Data Sources
The empirical material that informs this paper stems from a 4-year (April 2012 –
December 2015) research project based on three core data collection methods. First, we
searched the websites of consulting ﬁrms, professional associations and ratings agencies,
and reviewed documents containing references to the term ‘risk culture’ in the ﬁnancial
sector. In addition, regulatory reports published since the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis
were reviewed. These documents can be seen as ‘normative practitioner texts’: they are
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written for practitioners and reﬂect normative guidance on what ‘good’ risk culture
should look like. On this basis, the analysis of these documents helped to gain a sense of
the discourse of risk culture, its links with the deﬁnition of problems of ‘excessive’ risk-
taking and the presentation of possible reform strategies.
Second, we were able to gain research access to the senior risk managers of ﬁve banks
and four insurance companies, who permitted semi-structured interviews with senior
risk personnel and other members of staff. In three organizations, we were able to facili-
tate group discussions based on the use of a short survey instrument. We also conducted
semi-structured interviews with regulators, members of professional associations and
members of advisory ﬁrms. In one of these, we participated on several occasions in their
product development discussions. As shown in Table I, we also conducted ad hoc inter-
views and meetings with individuals in senior Risk Function roles and with other actors
such as freelance consultants, although these interviews generally did not lead to further
interactions and case analysis. In total, we met 65 individuals, in addition to the group
discussion processes. When we could not record the meetings, detailed ﬁeld notes were
taken by each researcher and then collectively discussed soon after data collection.
Third, as a strategy of ﬁeld immersion, we participated individually and collectively
in several events, which were organized by banks and insurers, consulting ﬁrms and pro-
fessional bodies with the speciﬁc aim of discussing the concept and implications of risk
culture. These sessions normally involved senior and middle managers in a range of
positions, including Chief Executive Ofﬁcers (CEOs), Chief Risk Ofﬁcers (CROs),
Heads of Business Units, Internal Auditors and Compliance Ofﬁcers, as well as consul-
tants, regulators and representatives of accounting, auditing and risk management
Table I. Sources of data
Type of actor Sources of data
Financial sector organizations  Face-to-face interviews with 27 individuals
 Telephone interviews with 3 individuals
 Internal surveys with members of staff in 4 organizations
 4 internal workshops
Consultancy ﬁrms  Face-to-face interviews with 8 individuals
 3 workshops (on invitation)
 2 breakfast/dinner meetings
 Several ad hoc meetings at public events
Regulators  Face-to-face interviews with 4 policy advisers
Professional associations  Meetings with members of internal audit association,
ISO (risk management committee), insurance association
(2 members), accounting association (2 members), risk
management associations (3 members)
 3 public events
 3 internal workshops
Other interviews and meetings  Face-to-face interviews and meetings with senior risk managers
(insurers and banks) and other actors (e.g. freelance consultants,
HR specialists)
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professional bodies. Detailed notes were taken while attending those sessions, allowing
us to capture extracts of conversations between participants.
Research Background and Selection of an Exemplar Site
Our methodological orientation produced disparate sets of data. In our initial analysis
of the research project’s data, we aimed to document the variety of workstreams and
actors involved in the operationalization of risk culture at the organizational level and to
understand systematic patterns, not least in terms of the organizational authority of the
Risk Function, and how it theorized the trade-off between opportunity and precaution
in constructing risk culture.
However, this initial data analysis produced more puzzles than answers, in large part
because the nature of risk culture workstreams was changing over time. For example,
our preliminary analysis of risk culture workstreams in 2012 revealed that actors were
both warmly disposed towards a more interactive managerial approach to culture and
inﬂuence over behaviour, and also openly critical of more formal diagnostic methods.
Interviewees seemed to be mindful of policy prescriptions to create, for example, an
open environment for ‘thoughtful debate’ (Sants, 2012) rather than reducing risk culture
to a matter of ﬁnancial incentives.
Yet, while these organizational actors were reluctant to endorse purely procedural
approaches to risk culture, they also recognized the need to demonstrate, to boards as
much as to regulators, that ‘something was being done’. In other words, there had to be
some form of documentary evidence, almost regardless of its content and causal efﬁcacy
in terms of cultural change (Bromley and Powell, 2012). Towards the end of our study,
we observed the steady proliferation of more formal diagnostic tools, such as surveys. In
some cases it seemed as if the ability to run a credible survey was in itself an indicator of
the organizational authority of the Risk Function, regardless of the information that
such tools could provide. The results from risk culture surveys were often the basis for
metrics of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ risk culture that contributed to performance reviews.
This initially observed tension and dynamic within risk culture workstreams could
not be explained solely in terms of the institutional complexity of ends, i.e., the
complexity created by the logics of opportunity and precaution. Rather, it had
more to do with a complexity of means or management processes. Not only did
reﬂection on this puzzle require us to combine insights from work on means-ends
decoupling and institutional complexity as described in the previous section, but we
also decided to analyse in more depth the data collected from a speciﬁc case – an
international insurance company anonymized as Alpha. Our aim was to document
in a more granular way whether and how the means of intervention could be asso-
ciated with distinctive logics of action, and how such logics could be related to the
logics of opportunity and precaution.
Alpha is an exemplar research site within our study for three reasons. First, in common
with the other organizations to which we obtained research access, it has ‘systemic’
importance for the UK ﬁnancial regulator. Second, our prolonged engagement with key
actors in Alpha meant that we could in principle access the longitudinal dynamics of risk
culture workstreams. Third, within Alpha, responsibility for risk culture was allocated to
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a risk manager who was also externally recognized as an inﬂuential ‘carrier’ (Sahlin-
Andersson and Engwall, 2002) of risk culture ideas and practices, often speaking at pub-
lic events and seminars. For this reason, we expected that Alpha would be a setting in
which the workstream on risk culture would have both internal prominence and exter-
nal visibility.
Our analysis of Alpha’s risk culture workstream is based on multiple sources of data.
We met three times (plus informal meetings at public events) the person who eventually
became responsible for the risk culture workstream in the second half of 2012. Given
the pivotal role in our analysis, we speciﬁcally indicate this person as the ‘Risk Manager’
in the case narrative that follows. One of the meetings with the Risk Manager was also
attended by a person – with a background in consulting, corporate and ﬁnancial services
– with whom the Risk Manager worked closely to elaborate ideas and practices about
risk culture. In addition, we met ﬁve other managers, who all had signiﬁcant work expe-
rience in Alpha in various roles. When the interviews were carried out, two were senior
managers in the Risk Function, two were working in Human Resources (HR) and one
in the area of regulatory compliance. All the meetings were recorded and subsequently
fully transcribed.
Other sources of data included attendance at events where Alpha’s managers pre-
sented their approach to risk culture, a review of internal documents (e.g., presentations
with phases and expected outcomes of risk culture work), observation of risk culture-
related posters in the ofﬁce corridors, and analysis of publicly available documents, such
as annual reports and corporate governance documents. Finally, managers from Alpha’s
Risk Function attended the presentation of the interim and ﬁnal results of our broad
research project. We obtained feedback on the research project report and on a docu-
ment containing a selection of indicative quotations that have been used to develop the
case study.
Data Analysis
We analysed the data collected from Alpha in three sequential steps. Initially, we found
evidence of what can be seen as the ‘problematization’ of work arrangements related to
the Risk Function and risk management processes. Early discussions reﬂected concerns
with the status of the Risk Function and criticisms of formal risk management. But this
problematization of existing practices and aspirations for change included conﬂicting
views on how to balance the need for more visible risk management roles and processes,
with the ambition to maintain a ‘performance-orientated’ culture. Because of these ten-
sions, from the outset we regarded Alpha as a prima facie relevant site for the investiga-
tion of organizational responses to institutional complexity.
In the second phase of our analysis, we adopted an inductive approach to the deriva-
tion and analysis of logics (Reay and Jones, 2016), trying to induce key patterns underly-
ing the selection of practices, the theorization of risk culture and the mobilization of
organizational actors towards it. In line with previous studies based on the analysis of
qualitative data (see Gioia et al., 2013), our coding strategy initially produced a broad
list of ﬁrst-order themes, which reﬂected the various ways in which organizational actors
framed their activities on risk culture. We subsequently reduced these ﬁrst-order themes
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to a set of second-order themes by clustering them both in relation to their focus (e.g.,
work practices vs. theorization efforts) and also in relation to their prevalence over the
period covered in our study. For example, in 2013, the workstream could be character-
ised predominantly by an emphasis on ‘interactive’ practices such as networking and
conversation enablers. Subsequently, it could be characterised by an emphasis on ‘diag-
nostic’ practices, such as measures linked to incentives. Finally, we distilled these second
order themes even further into two aggregate dimensions, which we designate as organic
and engineered logics of means. These two inductively derived logics underpin our theori-
zation of the institutional complexity which is at stake in Alpha’s workstream. Figure 1
provides an overview of this three stage data structure.
The third step in our analysis of Alpha’s data focused on how key organizational actors
experienced the conﬂicting views about the ends of the risk culture workstream and, by
implication, the complexity of different means of risk culture production. We capture
perceptions of complexity based on actor references to such things as: internal pushback,
limited resources to accomplish tasks, unclear targets and uncertainty about the selection
of appropriate courses of action. In so doing, we were able to partly ground the deriva-
tion of the two logics in Figure 1 in changes in perceived complexity.
The analysis of Alpha’s workstream over time provided the basis for developing a
model of risk culture dynamics. In building this model, our mode of analysis shifted
from inductive to abductive reasoning as we iterated between the speciﬁc ﬁndings from
the Alpha case and prior work on responses to institutional complexity and means-ends
decoupling. In so doing, we highlight similarities with, and points of contrast to, previous
studies of responses to institutional complexity. However, most importantly, we outline
Figure 1. Logics of means in Alpha. [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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the dynamics that support our key claim that, in the case of risk culture, means and ends
seem to be co-produced via conﬂicting logics of actions, rather than decoupled (Bromley
and Powell, 2012). In addition, to corroborate elements of the model of risk culture
dynamics derived inductively from the Alpha case, we also returned to the broader data
set of our project on risk culture. In this way, we were able to conﬁrm, albeit tentatively,
more general features of the navigation of institutional complexity via risk culture work-
streams. Thereby, we also reinforced the status of Alpha as an exemplar of ﬁeld-level
dynamics in the production of risk culture.
In summary, our data presentation strategy reﬂects a combination of the inductive
analysis of a speciﬁc site to develop a model of risk culture dynamics which is then
abductively corroborated by insights deriving from prior literature as well as from the
other settings to which we had access. To organize our data presentation below, we bor-
row from Nicolini (2009) the idea of ‘zooming in’ and ‘zooming out’. First, we zoom in
to the risk culture ﬁeld to explore the level of operationalization and its underlying logics
in Alpha. Second, in line with a critical realist perspective (Danermark et al., 2002;
Reed, 2005), we zoom out to reﬂect on patterns and mechanisms that cannot strictly be
observed but are theorized as producing the observed level of experience and work by
organizational actors.
ZOOMING IN: PRODUCING RISK CULTURE AS CORPORATE CHANGE
Alpha’s organizational initiatives on risk culture were triggered by perceived failures in
the Risk Function and problems for its status. The Risk Function ‘was not seen to be
held in high regard and certainly didn’t have much inﬂuence in the organization’ (senior
risk manager). A challenging report from Internal Audit highlighted deﬁciencies in the
contribution of the Risk Function. As put bluntly by a senior risk manager: ‘we as an
organization recognized [that] we needed to invest more heavily in risk management’.
In such a context, the initial interactions with Alpha’s managers suggested uncertainty
and conﬂicting views about what a risk culture workstream should achieve. There was
open criticism of the past orientation towards procedures and compliance in risk man-
agement. Even the manager responsible for regulatory compliance argued that ‘if you
go back a number of years, you’ll ﬁnd there was a heavy compliance component so you
had lots of status on how people progress by implementing frameworks or assessment
against each type of risk, and how well it’s been complied with’. This predominant focus
on framework compliance meant that risk had very little relevance to decision makers.
In fact, the same interviewee argued that managers in some parts of the organization
‘were quite happy to do risk management if somebody came and held their hand, there
was less willingness to do it on their own’.
In response to this criticism of compliance oriented risk management, risk managers
aspired to something that was ‘embedded’ in daily decision-making, providing the basis
for ‘risk conversations’. This necessitated ﬁnding a ‘clever way’ to get information
reported without putting too much of a burden on the business and to establish trust in
the Risk Function. It also meant that the language and goals of risk management had to
get closer to the needs of front-line staff. For example, according to one senior risk man-
ager, it was necessary that ‘as much thought is given to opportunity in the upside of risk
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as is currently given to downside compliance’. Accordingly, at the outset we were aware
of tensions in these change aspirations for the Risk Function — tensions which mirrored
the societal-level problem of the balance between risk control and risk-taking in ﬁnancial
institutions discussed at the beginning of this paper.
This tension was evident in senior managers’ attitudes towards risk reporting and
their trust in the Risk Function. One interviewee stressed the need to make individuals
able and willing ‘to report risks openly and honestly without getting [their] head bitten
off from the second that’s done’ (compliance manager). Yet another interviewee warned
about a potential trade-off between open and honest reporting and the pressures for
opportunity-seeking behaviour within a performance-orientated culture:
‘One of the things that we’re cautious about [is that as] you introduce a more
performance-orientated culture and more accountability then obviously you may
negatively impact the willingness of people to talk about mistakes’. (Senior risk
manager)
More generally, despite the ﬁnancial crisis, there were still concerns about losing sight of
risk and risk control. One interviewee commented that it was important ‘that risk
doesn’t lose some prominence as a result of being intermingled with customers and peo-
ple and other things’ (HR manager). People may become ‘overexcited’ and do deals
that lead to ‘a bizarre incident’ (HR manager). The relation between risk control and a
performance culture seemed to be inherently unstable. As put by one interviewee,
‘when the decay happens, you don’t spot it and then the pendulum will start to swing
the other way’ (compliance manager). An internal presentation warned that pressures to
meet sales targets ‘may cause risk factors to be ignored’.
As we show below, within Alpha, this complexity of ends effectively became displaced
and translated into a different kind of complexity, namely that of the means through
which the change ambitions could be made operable, giving rise to considerable uncer-
tainty and to pragmatic experimentation.
New Standards, Policies, and Communication and Training Programmes
At the time of our ﬁrst visit, in 2012, managers from Risk, Compliance and Human
Resources supported a series of changes to make risk more prominent in organizational
conversations. One junior person was made responsible for acquiring ‘input from two
or three external private companies’ (HR manager) and put together material to sup-
port different lines of action for discussion by members of a cross-functional team.
The changes that followed were partly structural and informational, including the
creation of a database to record the risk information resulting both from whistleblowing
and also from more routinized risk and loss event reporting. ‘Risk policies’ and ‘business
standards’ were also developed in order to clarify the behaviours which should be
encouraged or avoided. These new policies were supported and animated by the use of
concrete examples, ranging from pre-employment screening to new product
development.
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Another set of changes concerned ‘communication and training’ which included dif-
ferent elements: compulsory training in new regulatory requirements for all directors to
‘help people understand how we make money and make better business decisions ’ (HR
manager); a new section of the intranet, which ‘attracted the most hits of any portion of
our internal site’ (HR manager); and the creation of a ﬁctional character for a web-
based game to exemplify issues about risk-taking and control decisions.
These new risk policies and communication programmes constituted visible and top-
down supported activities, and even received external recognition in the form of an
award for the best communication programme. However, while interest in risk culture
within Alpha and other organizations was beginning to take off, the lack of a consistent
industry perspective on this intangible object was acknowledged as a problem. Within
Alpha, risk managers recognized pushback from certain business areas unaccustomed to
dealing with the ‘softer elements’ of behaviour in organizations, such as the actuarial
and ﬁnance functions. The risk section on the intranet and the use of a ﬁctional charac-
ter as a conversation enabler received mixed responses: ‘some people loved it as a simple
explanation, some people thought it was a bit puerile’ (HR manager).
Overall, members of the cross-functional team came to recognize organizational
fatigue with, as well as a lack of direction in the orientation of, the wide range of new
policies and change programmes which had been more or less loosely connected to a
vague object – risk culture. In line with Bromley and Powell’s notion of means-ends
decoupling, an internal presentation asked whether the new policies and structures were
‘effectively achieving the intended outcome’.
Joining the Dots
In the second half of 2012, responsibility for risk culture was allocated to a single indi-
vidual (hereafter: Risk Manager). This person had extensive experience in various risk-
related roles, but also experience in a large consulting company which had been one of
the ﬁrst to provide risk culture services. The Risk Manager also contributed signiﬁcantly
to the guidance on risk culture published by a professional association of risk managers
(hereafter: Risk Institute).
Faced with a wealth of new policies, procedures and communication programmes but
also with a perceived lack of understanding of what they meant from a risk culture per-
spective, the Risk Manager focused on ‘ﬁne-tuning’ existing instruments and ‘pragmati-
cally’ connecting processes, people and tools that may be relevant to offset
‘vulnerabilities’ in risk culture. This way of pragmatically reaching out for anything that may
be relevant for risk culture was sustained by personal experience. For example, the Risk
Manager believed that Alpha lacked the conditions for the successful implementation of
a large-scale risk culture survey based on previous experience with a similar initiative in
a different insurer.
At this time, the Risk Manager found the term ‘organic’ a useful label to capture two
speciﬁc dimensions of the work being done. The ﬁrst was the way in which risk culture
was ‘theorized’ as an object of managerial intervention. Risk culture in Alpha was not
one thing, but many things that could (and should) be connected to each other. Theoriz-
ing risk culture in this way was therefore necessarily expansive. As put by the Risk
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Manager, it implied a commitment to capture and work with organizational complexity
by ‘linking the dots’ and developing ‘a sense of how everything is connected’ rather than
reducing risk culture to a one-dimensional deﬁnition.
Second, this way of theorizing risk culture was intertwined with a recognition of the
value of practices that support organizational interaction. For example, internal net-
working became an important component of risk culture work, not least to ‘inﬂuence
and organize a number of people who are interested in the topic’ (Risk Manager). There
were also frequent references to existing processes that would enable risk conversations.
In fact, one interviewee referred to previous experience in the business end of the orga-
nization to suggest that even the existing formal risk framework could form the basis for
a meaningful conversation:
‘I actually spent a huge amount of time with someone from the second line [Risk
Function] who was basically explaining to me how I should manage my own risks.
And things like loss events, near misses, breaches, all made 100 per cent sense to me
when it was explained that this was the model that we had to work to’. (HR manager)
However, this organic logic and its underlying efforts to operationalize risk culture gave
rise to another source of complexity for the Risk Manager. First, the lack of new proc-
esses or instruments raised concerns elsewhere in Alpha that nothing visible and concrete
was being done on risk culture. Second, the informal networking and ‘joining the dots’
work described above was not formalized into a full time role. Risk culture-related
efforts were enacted in addition to a number of other activities that took most of the
Risk Manager’s internal working time. Not surprisingly in the light of these problem
areas, the statements made by the Risk Manager in early 2013 were cautious, as shown
by expressions such as: it is ‘broadly an ambition for me’; ‘I don’t have still the full sup-
port’; ‘it’s quite difﬁcult to get traction’.
Diagnostic Tools and Modelling
In the second half of 2013, the presence of an HR specialist and a senior risk manager
during one of our meetings with the Risk Manager was a tangible sign of the emergence
of an internal network of people interested in the work of the Risk Manager. Our con-
versations with this group suggested that the Risk Manager’s pragmatic search for risk
culture-relevant levers had achieved organizational traction in a speciﬁc way – namely
via the use of a diagnostic tool adopted as part of a large-scale employee engagement
survey led by HR. When describing the tool, one interviewee displayed conﬁdence in
the speciﬁc contribution of the Risk Manager:
‘One of the pieces of work that [name of the Risk Manager] has supported this
year is that we, through our engagement survey, will be able to see some key indices
which actually together we’ve aggregated into an index around risk’. (HR manager)
The ‘organic’ internal networking efforts of the Risk Manager contributed to position
risk culture issues as part of the engagement survey process at Alpha. Moreover, the
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speciﬁc risk culture content of the survey was based on the Risk Manager’s personal
experience in the development of the Risk Institute’s guidance on risk culture. The Risk
Manager was able to identify a set of basic questions that could be added to the ques-
tionnaire, as well as to suggest dimensions such as ‘accountability’ and ‘tone from the
top’ that could be investigated with survey’s data.
From the use of the survey emerged a view of risk culture as something which could be
analytically deﬁned, identiﬁed and aligned with external guidelines and regulatory consulta-
tion documents. While there were references to an Alpha-speciﬁc model of risk culture (here-
after Alpha’s Model), there was also a growing interest in comparability and regulatory
norms. For example, the Risk Manager emphasized the need to identify ‘the traits or funda-
mental traits from the risk culture perspective’ and relate those to regulators’ expectations:
‘So if integrity is important to customers, which is an important thing given the
environment that we are in [given] FCA[3] expectations . . . so if customers is a key
element of our culture we just need to probably articulate that more explicitly’.
(Risk Manager)
This way of articulating risk culture was part of a discourse that was increasingly legiti-
mate internally and also more conﬁdent about what ought to be done about risk culture.
The diagnostic survey, combined with the work of the Risk Manager and attempts to
‘model’ risk culture, contributed to ‘good insight on where we are’ (Risk Manager) and
‘a sense of our baseline around culture’ (HR manager).
Measures, Incentives and Realizing Performance Potential
‘I think since we met you see much more push, external push, which means that inter-
nally it helps as well’ said the Risk Manager in early 2015. Targeting risk culture
appeared easier given more deﬁned expectations about what constitutes compelling evi-
dence of risk culture work. As shown in the following quote, early theorization efforts
and experimentation can now be tested against regulatory expectations, as well as
against guidance documents for risk managers:
‘I mean regulators are much more interested, so you have seen since we met a
paper from the FSB on risk culture and success factors around risk culture. So, you
have more guidelines and guidance and expectations around what they like to see.
You see, I have seen [many] more tangible ways to articulate what they like to see
from consultants [including] some measurements and things like that’. (Risk
Manager)
At one meeting, the Risk Manager invited an external person – at the time CRO for
another insurer – as the two of them ‘have worked very closely on the risk culture
topic’.[4] During the meeting, it was clear how the two had discussed ways in which their
internal models and diagnostic tools were aligned with each other, and with normative
practitioner texts such as the guidance documents on risk culture published by the Risk
Institute and the FSB.
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In Alpha we see that the early tentative informal network building approach was
increasingly displaced by the selective mobilization of external references, and by senior
executives driving risk culture considerations into the assessment of how decisions were
taken. As put by the Risk Manager, ‘now we are actually more top-down: the CEO and
HR are really more trying to drive it’. The risk culture space in the annual engagement
survey was consolidated into a set of questions that expressed Alpha’s Model. Members
of the Risk Function, including the Risk Manager, used the survey results, as well as
other qualitative elements, to evaluate key business decisions taken during the year. The
aim was to assess the achievement of a ‘risk and control objective’ set for each business
unit.
In this later period of our ﬁeldwork, the discourse of the Risk Manager and colleagues
suggested a normative orientation towards deﬁning targets for the ‘right’ behaviour and
‘strong’ risk culture. The previous ‘joining the dots’ efforts had given way to a more engi-
neered approach, i.e., risk culture was conceptualized as a target for management and a
latent variable to be measured (see Willman, 2014, Ch. 9). Survey results supported the
development of a ‘risk index’ (Risk Manager), which was related to in-depth assessments
of key business decisions. The index gained organizational traction thanks to the devel-
opment of links between risk culture data and incentives schemes, with real effects on
bonuses and career prospects. As put by a senior risk manager, ‘if we observe signiﬁ-
cantly negative risk management behaviours, that can knock out the bonus entirely’.
The Risk Manager gave the example of a senior manager who had to leave because of
‘weak risk culture and weak control environment’. According to the Risk Manager, it
was not only a matter of poor business outcomes, but ‘one of the elements was that tone
from the top wasn’t really the right thing’ (emphasis added).
As Alpha’s risk culture workstream unfolded over the period 2012–15, the produc-
tion of risk culture shifted from the challenges and uncertainty of a ‘pragmatic’ joining
the dots approach to a more ‘selective’ focus in which risk culture was increasingly
identiﬁed in terms of variables that can be measured, targeted, and compared across
business units, organizations and time. We found evidence of ‘simpliﬁcation processes’
(Kostova et al., 2008, p. 1002) whose reference points are FSB’s documents and other
guidelines, and internal targets. The Risk Function was now selectively mobilizing
‘something that’s going to hit pretty much everyone and so you’re focused on some
key questions’ (senior risk manager) rather than searching for new ways of dealing with
risk culture. The risk culture workstream had become more tangible and more ‘granu-
lar’, and the Risk Manager admitted that work on risk culture had now become ‘quite
powerful’.
As part of this change in the logic underlying the means of interventions on risk cul-
ture over time, we also observed a shift in the logics of ends underlying the aims of Alpha
and its Risk Function. At the beginning of the period covered in this study, there were
cautionary remarks about the dangers of swinging the pendulum too far in the direction
of performance. By the end, a different perspective seems to be preeminent. Risk culture
had crystallised as a workstream to help assess best practices around risk management
across different teams and individuals. In fact, all the diagnostic work around culture
was now about how you actually ‘unleash potential’ and ‘drive high performance’ (HR
manager). The Risk Manager reinforced these emerging connections between
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performance improvement and risk culture work. Members of the Risk Function now
had a licence to assess business units, their cultural traits and their progress towards the
achievement of performance targets.
ZOOMING OUT: NAVIGATING INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY
The preceding analysis provides a longitudinal snapshot of a risk culture workstream.
While the workstream was initiated in the wake of disappointment with existing (proce-
dural) ways of dealing with risk management, it ended up drawing on narrow concep-
tions of human agency which emphasize how risk culture can be engineered into
diagnostic tools, leading to clearly-identiﬁable and targetable behavioural change.
Moreover, while early work is characterized by cautionary remarks about the dangers of
overlooking risks when making new business deals, towards the end of our study of
Alpha, we observe a reframing of the role of the Risk Function in line with a
‘performance-orientated’ culture.
In what follows, we provide a schematic theorization of this outcome by ‘zooming
out’ from our ﬁeld work (Nicolini, 2009). We argue that the local production of risk cul-
ture within our event window at Alpha reveals more systemic features of reactions to
institutional complexity. Our inductive theory-building consolidates the insights derived
from the case study of Alpha in the light of previous work on institutional complexity and
means-ends decoupling. Finally, we corroborate key aspects of the model derived from
Alpha, albeit provisionally, with observations of risk culture workstreams in other
settings.
A Model of Risk Culture Dynamics
In Figure 2, we sketch a dynamic representation of the themes emerging from the case
of Alpha. At the core of the ﬁgure, we have the two logics of means (organic vs. engi-
neered), which are derived from and characterize distinctive patterns underlying the
selection of managerial practices, the theorization of risk culture and the mobilization of
organizational actors towards it. The ﬁgure also emphasizes three key dynamics: the
shift from complexity of ends to complexity of means and the parallel ampliﬁcation of
complexity; the shift from an organic to an engineered logic of risk culture production;
complexity reduction with the consolidation of an engineered logic, and the parallel
reframing of organizational ends.
In line with previous studies informed by an institutional logics perspective (Thornton
et al., 2012), the case of Alpha suggests, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the onset of risk cul-
ture workstreams can be related to the local problematization of existing work routines
and to the theorization of new work processes and abstract categories (Strang and
Meyer, 1993). Problematization involves more than just criticism of procedural
approaches to risk management and the perceived lack of status of the Risk Function.
Part of the discussion also revolves around the more general complexity issue of balanc-
ing risk control and risk-taking (Power, 2014), reﬂecting societal level reaction to exces-
sively risky business decisions.
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In the light of such debates, organizational actors in Alpha experience conﬂicting insti-
tutional demands around organizational ends (Pache and Santos, 2010), which is typical
of situations of institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011). But we ﬁnd that
organizational actors also experience an additional form of complexity in terms of the
means through which ambiguously-deﬁned ends can be achieved. Consistent with
recent work on means-ends decoupling (Bromley and Powell, 2012; Dick, 2015; Wijen,
2014), we observe in Alpha an explosion of new policies, processes, change programmes
but also increased perplexity about their purpose, leading often to internal pushback.
Moreover, at this early stage, the risk culture workstream exhibits many of the features
of means-ends decoupling (Wijen, 2014): a multitude of heterogeneous actors, the
absence of ﬁeld-level ‘best practices’, and unease with the unobservability of risk culture.
Our process model takes this apparent means-ends decoupling as its point of depar-
ture and sheds light on the ideational dynamics that follow from actor perceptions of
complexity about means. As argued above in the data analysis section, our analysis of
Alpha supports the inductive delineation of two logics of means, which derive from and
characterize distinctive practices and ways to mobilize organizational attention (Thorn-
ton et al., 2012, Ch. 6). The two logics of means are also intertwined with the very theo-
rization of the object of intervention itself, namely risk culture. Such theorization work
does not precede the workstream it informs, but rather both are co-produced and mutu-
ally constitutive (see Friedland, 2012).
Figure 2 provides a dynamic view of how the two logics of means are interrelated in
order to explain the shift from one to another. We place pragmatic reaching out outside the
Figure 2. The organizational dynamics of risk culture. [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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realm of the organic logic to highlight its role as a ‘generative’ mechanism. As with other
studies of actor-level accounts of responses to institutional complexity (see ‘situated
improvising’ in Smets et al., 2012), pragmatic reaching out is neither purely strategic
nor unintentional. Rather, it implies that organizational actors have a provisional under-
standing of what is possible for a new workstream (e.g., in a cost-constrained environ-
ment an ad hoc large-scale survey would not receive enough support), and are also
sufﬁciently open-minded to search for new methods and new internal allies to make pro-
gress with risk culture.
Pragmatic reaching out can also be interpreted as a ‘sensemaking’ mechanism,
through which ‘social actors turn circumstances into situations that are comprehended
explicitly in words and that serve as springboards for action’ (Thornton et al., 2012, p.
96). In our model, pragmatic reaching out is a way to mobilize action via interactive
practices such as internal networking and the use of conversation enablers. In turn, these
interactively-oriented practices contribute to a more expansive theorization of risk cul-
ture as an object. On this view, risk culture as an object results from ‘joining the dots’
between current processes and activities rather than being theorized in a way that sepa-
rates it from other facets of organizational life. In short, logics of means and the objects
to which they are oriented co-emerge (Friedland, 2012).
We also place pragmatic reaching out at the end of the cycle within the organic
logic box for two reasons. First, it does not stop but runs in parallel with the use of
interactive practices and expansive theorization. Second, pragmatic reaching out also
acts as a ‘bridging’ mechanism (Smets et al., 2015) between different logics of means.
We posit that, by pragmatically reaching out, organizational actors such as the Risk
Manager in Alpha learn from experience where they can or cannot get traction. A key
ﬁnding in Alpha is that organizational actors begin to recognize that the organic logic,
and its implied conception of risk culture as an object, creates problems for their abil-
ity to intervene in the business end of the organization. For example, the Risk Man-
ager had to respond to the criticism that nothing (visible) on risk culture was being
done. However, by reaching out to others with a stake in the culture debate, organiza-
tional actors also learn about speciﬁc tools that could help deal with such criticisms
within a resource-constrained environment. In this way, within Alpha, risk culture
became more closely associated with the deployment of a survey-based tool for the
diagnosis of culture.
This turn towards diagnostic cultural tools in Alpha reﬂects a more generalized
dynamic, namely that ‘practices are not merely determined reﬂections of institutional
logics; they are also tangible focal points for shifts or alterations in institutional logics’
(Thornton et al., 2012, p. 129). The survey is not proceduralist per se. In line with an
organic logic, it could in principle be used as a conversation enabler, as was the case ini-
tially with the risk framework in Alpha. However, the possibility of its use sets in motion
the conditions for increased proceduralism. To make it credibly operational, it requires
the deﬁnition of key aspects of a risk culture model that can be aligned with existing
models and regulatory expectations. In so doing, organizational actors can represent the
survey as a valuable support for benchmarking and target setting.
We use the term selective mobilization to emphasize this shift from a rather open-ended
process of reaching out towards the selection of key reference points for comparison and
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targeting, and for the foregrounding and prioritization of speciﬁc audiences (see the idea
of ‘reorienting the normative network’ by Smets et al., 2012). By the term ‘mobilization’
we also seek to emphasize the shift from the tentative, and rather open-ended, activities
of a single actor to the collective work of a group of actors who are mindful of the
opportunities and constraints posed by institutionalized demands for auditable evidence
of ‘good’ risk culture (Power, 1997).
In our model, selective mobilization replaces earlier pragmatic reaching out efforts
and provides a way to address the complexity of means through simpliﬁcation processes
(Kostova et al., 2008), exempliﬁed in Alpha by the dominance of a speciﬁc reading of
risk culture in terms of remuneration and incentives. More generally we can say that the
initially uncertain ‘risk object’ (Hilgartner, 1992), symptomatic of reckless risk-taking,
was increasingly framed in language which emphasized the possibility of behavioural
change and performance improvement. In this way, risk culture in Alpha, which was ini-
tially associated with a shift towards a logic of precaution, became transformed, reduced
and appropriated within a speciﬁc workstream that revalidated a logic of opportunity
and risk-taking. The dynamic model which we have derived from the case of Alpha sug-
gests that, as organizational actors navigate institutional complexity, ends and means co-
evolve over time as they are reconstructed through workstreams animated by different
of logics.
Supporting Insights from the Risk Culture (Battle)Field
Drawing on our broad data set, we can tentatively triangulate the process model
induced from the case study of Alpha with workstreams at other institutions, including
regulators, professional associations and consulting ﬁrms. By the end of our study, there
was no shortage of normative practitioner texts embodying what we call an engineered
logic. For example, the FSB 2014 guidance provides a ‘framework for assessing risk cul-
ture’ that indicates elements and indicators of a ‘sound’ risk culture. Practitioner articles
also provide an abundance of diagnostic tools in the form of wheels, scorecards and
frameworks (Davidson et al., 2012; Deloitte, 2015; EY, 2015; IRM, 2012; Levy et al.,
2010; PWC, 2012). In line with the process model developed above, these diagnostic
tools frame risk culture as an opportunity for performance improvement and emphasize
the possibility of behavioural change via new management tools.
However, our interactions with advisers and regulators between 2012 and 2015 also
showed how the development of such an outcome went through a process similar to the
one illustrated in Figure 2. This was particularly evident from our prolonged engage-
ment with a group of advisers from a global consulting and auditing ﬁrm. As with Alpha,
the beginnings of their workstream on risk culture was characterised by the problemat-
ization of existing risk management frameworks and scepticism about ﬁnancial incen-
tives as an ultimate explanation of individuals’ behaviour. These views were expressed
during our meetings but also surfaced in their thought leadership papers and explora-
tory surveys on speciﬁc problem areas (some of which were cited by Alpha’s Risk Man-
ager). Nevertheless, as recognized by one adviser[5], all this activity only led to
‘rambling’ conversations and they felt pressurized to ﬁnd something ‘tangible’ to ‘propa-
gate a good risk culture’. Like Alpha, a diagnostic survey provided the basis for the shift
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from risk culture as a ‘great talking point’ to something amenable to measurement and
management (see Willman, 2014, Ch. 9). As part of this shift, the workstream came to
be occupied by remuneration experts with a focus on individual incentives.
The early uncertainty in the internal workstreams of advisers, who are normally
regarded as key suppliers of new management ideas (Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall,
2002), reinforces the view that the risk culture ﬁeld was initially characterized by the
lack of a clear centre of production and a high degree of opacity (Wijen, 2014). Regula-
tors, advisers and corporate actors were searching for ways to reframe the balance
between risk-taking and control via risk culture, but in so doing they encountered, and
experimented with, a number of diverging activities and ideas. So not only the Risk
Manager in Alpha, but also other actors in ﬁnancial services were tentatively trying to
construct networks of likeminded participants. Even the production of the FSB guidance
relied on the ‘collective experience and efforts of supervisory and regulatory authorities
across the FSB membership and insights garnered from market participants through
roundtables and bilateral discussions’ (FSB, 2013, cover page).
All of these networking initiatives faced a similar problem of producing something
tangible that would sustain further interaction and work efforts. The key challenge was
how to get from culture as a ‘soft’ thing, shaping and being shaped by ‘contact time’, to
risk culture as an advisable and manageable object. In line with our process model, in
both consulting ﬁrms and corporate institutions, risk culture workstreams gravitated
towards an engineered logic.
While the case of Alpha is indicative of a cooperative transition, there was more con-
ﬂict in other settings. Some initiatives which reﬂected an organic logic were associated
with speciﬁc individuals and groups whose internal authority was far from uncontested.
By problematizing existing practices, they also sought to expand their organizational
footprint. For example, in the UK subsidiary of another insurance conglomerate, a
team of risk managers organized focus groups with the involvement of senior manage-
ment to discuss staff responses to a short questionnaire. The CEO claimed that one of
the sessions was ‘thought-provoking, and that’s the important thing’. The head of the
team organizing the session subsequently commented, with satisfaction, on the level of
senior management involvement. In an internationally active bank, a new oversight
body was created to mediate the business front-line and the board, stimulating attention
to risk culture via scenario analysis and case-based discussions. This new body co-existed
with a more traditional Risk Function. The risk oversight body had the authority to do
‘deep dives’ on any part of the business, including commercial units, while the tradi-
tional Risk Function did not have this possibility.
Yet, both these ‘creative’ initiatives became contested. In less than two years, between
2012 and 2014, other groups of functional experts, including members of the Risk Func-
tion, leveraged different means of intervention in risk culture. The oversight structure in
the bank was problematized given the difﬁculty of explaining its anomalous position,
which cut across different lines of responsibility, to regulators. Eventually, the main
focus of intervention became a branch-level incentives-based approach led by the tradi-
tional side of the Risk Function. The survey-based discussions in the insurer also lost
traction. A challenging internal audit report emphasized the lack of clearly articulated
targets for risk culture. Following an organizational restructure, a new team designed a
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different set of interventions, with the ambition to develop metrics and targets for risk
culture improvement, as part of what a risk manager deﬁned as the ‘refreshed culture
piece’.
In both cases, the new means of intervention reﬂected both a turn towards an engi-
neered approach to risk culture production and also the aspiration by members of the
Risk Function to promote and rebuild a logic of opportunity and risk-taking. The risk
manager leading the new initiatives in the insurer stated that their role was to help the
business to recognize where risks should be taken. The head of risk management in the
bank emphasized that the new metric-driven initiative had a real impact ‘at the coalface
of the boys and girls that sit on the counter in a branch’, helping them to know their cus-
tomers better and to realize proﬁts while ‘doing the right thing’.
These additional insights support the view that risk culture workstreams are a patch-
work of activities that occur at dispersed sites where discrete, but not entirely autono-
mous, clusters of actors work to develop ideas and practice. The use of an organic logic
is not only a way to make sense of mixed activities in an opaque ﬁeld, but also a way to
improve the organizational footprint of groups of functional experts whose authority is
far from being consolidated. An organic logic implies the theorization of new control
and communication processes that challenge existing routines and hierarchical relation-
ships. But these new processes are ‘creative’ solutions, whose characteristics or outcomes
are hard to explain or demonstrate – as in the case of the risk oversight body and the
focus groups brieﬂy discussed above. As noted by Strang and Meyer (1993), there is an
inevitable tension between individual theorising and legitimated collective theorization.
While local theories often gain traction by running counter to common sense, theories
that are line with standard thinking are more reproducible.
An engineered logic of means holds wider organizational appeal in terms of generating
workstreams which produce demonstrable, reproducible and comparable results. It also pro-
duces relatively simple and non-controversial explanations for ﬁnancial sector failures.
Towards the end of our ﬁeld work, we sensed the apparent domination of risk culture narra-
tives by problems of performance management and remuneration design in Alpha and other
settings, reinforced by a societal level ‘moral panic’ about bankers’ pay in the UK (House of
Commons Treasury Committee, 2009). This focus excluded more psychologically and
anthropologically compelling explanations of behaviour based on peer group recognition,
perceived local status and social networks. Finally, as emphasized in our process model, the
turn to a less expansive engineered logic produces a means of organizational intervention
that seems to be correlated with a return of the ‘pendulum’ to a logic of opportunity in fram-
ing the fundamental ends of ﬁnancial institutions.
This additional evidence from our immersion in the ﬁeld suggests that the model of
risk culture dynamics derived from Alpha is not simply an idiosyncratic description of
that case, but potentially has more general properties. Despite the fact that initial trig-
gers for risk culture workstreams at the organization level are critical reactions to proce-
dural approaches to risk management and initially motivate a gravitation towards an
organic logic of means, we observe a return to proceduralism and to an engineered
logic. Our model also suggests that those who are able to pragmatically deploy both log-
ics of means, as they navigate institutional complexity and muddle through the chal-
lenges posed by their internal workstreams, are likely to maintain or even extend their
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organizational footprint – as in the case of the Risk Manager in Alpha. Those organiza-
tional actors who rely mainly on idiosyncratic approaches may beneﬁt from increased
visibility in the immediate aftermath of a crisis. But they are also likely to be challenged
thereafter, since an organic logic ampliﬁes local complexity.
In contrast, the turn to an engineered logic helps to de-complexify the complexity of
both ends and means by producing accessible and reproducible means of intervention
which contribute to redeﬁne the balance between risk-taking and control. And they rede-
ﬁne it in a way that helps to obfuscate the uncomfortable fact that, as put by one individ-
ual developing a risk culture audit methodology in a large bank, in many areas it may be
impossible to make money if ﬁnancial institutions want to do things ‘in the right way’[6].
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have argued that, following the ﬁnancial crisis and the growing empha-
sis on the need to ﬁx their defective risk cultures, ﬁnancial sector institutions confronted
institutional complexity due to a societal and regulatory shift in criteria to deﬁne and
evaluate what they should aim for, as well as uncertainty about what constituted an
appropriate means through which this complexity of ends could be addressed. We have
shown that a dynamic constellation of logics of ends and means is embodied in evolving
workstreams, which are both oriented to, and productive of, risk culture as an organiza-
tional object of intervention.
The paper is based on our ‘journey’ as researchers into multiple settings where risk
culture was debated and instrumentalized. Our analysis of risk culture raises as many
questions as it seeks to answer, both about risk culture speciﬁcally and about the ‘pro-
duction’ of new managerial objects in the face of institutional complexity more gener-
ally. More work could be done to delineate the network character of risk culture
production, drawing explicitly both on conventional network analysis (Padgett and
Powell, 2012) as well as on Actor-Network-Theory (Latour, 2005). Moreover, the emer-
gent nature of risk culture may suggest that we observed the messy, initial phase in the
lifecycle of a new concept. The beginnings of what seems today more measurable and
manageable (e.g., safety culture in aviation) may have been equally messy. While our
analysis suggests that risk culture may not mature in the same way, further studies would
be helpful to complement the insights developed in this paper.
Bearing in mind these limitations, the case of risk culture in the UK should be of general
interest to organization and management scholars studying both responses to institutional
complexity and also the emergence of new practices that have an opaque relationship to out-
comes. Our core claim is that organizational actors do not only experience the complexity
deriving from societal pressures to create ‘better’ risk cultures and to rebalance two logics of
risk-taking which exist in tension with one another. Rather, we ﬁnd that this complexity and
the tension it represents, becomes translated into another one, reﬂecting different orienta-
tions towards the means through which risk culture might become visible as an object capa-
ble of being reformed. At the level of workstreams, organizational actors aimed for, but
found it hard to sustain, organic approaches to risk culture and collectively reacted by gravi-
tating to more reductive approaches, which emphasize performance improvement and
behavioural change via new measurement techniques.
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In this way, our study contributes to research on responses to institutional complexity
(Greenwood et al., 2011). While previous work tends to consider ‘technical’ problems of
means as being somehow ‘peripheral’ and distinct from conﬂicting pressures at the goals
level (see Pache and Santos, 2010, p. 464), our study of risk culture shows that conﬂict
and pressures about means have implications for ends and vice versa. Therefore, pres-
sures about both ends and means are a key feature of the institutional complexity that
organizational actors must navigate.
We also extend a growing body of actor-level accounts of responses to institutional
complexity (e.g., McPherson and Sauder, 2013; Smets and Jarzabkowski, 2013; Smets
et al., 2015; Smets et al., 2012; Voronov et al., 2013), showing how logics of ends and
means are reconstructed as organizational actors muddle through the challenges posed
by their risk culture workstreams. Our process model sheds light on the dynamics
through which organizational actors seek to de-complexify the complexity of both ends
and means, thus contributing to calls for work on how organizations can de-intensify
institutional complexity’s pressures (Greenwood et al., 2011).
Moreover, in line with critical commentaries of the institutional logics approach (Fried-
land, 2012), this study stresses how logics in action are intertwined with the theorization of
objects of intervention and that such theorization work depends on the practices conducted
through and with them. A risk culture workstream does not simply implement a pre-given
task – be it cross-border law services (Smets et al., 2012), court decisions (McPherson and
Sauder, 2013), wine-making (Voronov et al., 2013), reinsurance trading (Smets et al.,
2015) – but in fact constructs and operationalizes the object of intervention itself.
The ﬁndings reported in this paper are also relevant to recent studies that postulate
the emergence and persistence of increased decoupling between means and ends in
modern organizations (Bromley and Powell, 2012; Dick, 2015; Wijen, 2014). It is tempt-
ing to see the unfolding of risk culture workstreams as a pure form of means-ends decou-
pling in Bromley and Powell’s (2012) sense. For example, pressures for documentable
processes around risk culture shape reactions to the institutional complexity of shifting
ends, leading to something that has little to do with the aspired cultural change. Indeed,
there is a stark contrast between the initial aspirations for risk conversations and the ﬁnal
reductive focus on measures of risk culture.
However, we suggest that the case of risk culture is more one of means-ends co-forma-
tion than decoupling. What we describe as problematization in Figure 2 is both a
reaction to the danger of ‘overexcitement’ in business decision-making and excessive
risk-taking, and also a criticism of procedural approaches to risk management. The
repositioning of risk culture workstreams within an engineered logic is made possible
both by a reframing of organizational ends to emphasize opportunity and risk-taking,
and also by the parallel difﬁculty of making organic approaches visible and actionable.
In short, logics of ends and means change in relation to each other, and all of this is
embodied within the trajectory of risk culture workstreams.
Overall, we suggest that the sets of logics which agents confront and which deﬁne ‘insti-
tutional complexity’ may have internal, co-formative relations between each other which
deserve further exploration. Our study also reveals a, perhaps unsurprising, cyclical pattern
which deserves more analysis. Strong public reactions against excessive risk-taking and crit-
icism of an engineered logic to organizational practices reproduce those very same logics,
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although under the banner of improved risk culture. Therefore, responses to institutional
complexity may be inherently unstable, leading to shocks and endemic reform (Bromley
and Powell, 2012). It may be that organizational actors struggle to stabilize that which can-
not be stabilized: interdependent logics that reﬂect different sets of expectations about ends
and means and exist in a continuous dialectical relation with one another.
To conclude, we are not in a position to judge whether an engineered logic is a bad
outcome: we are not romantics of the organic. Given the highly ambiguous nature of
the object itself – risk culture – and the struggles of actors with this ambiguity, there is
no standpoint within our study from which to judge whether one operationalization of it
is better or worse than any other. An approach to risk culture that embodies an engi-
neered logic of means may become an end in itself and may recreate a mere illusion of
control over what can hardly be controlled via procedures (Power, 2007). But equally it
may also be used diagnostically as part of a forward-looking process (see, for example,
the ‘risk exposure calculator’ illustrated by Simons, 1999). While making a call on this
issue is beyond the scope of our study, it would not be surprising to organization
and management scholars if the very managerial processes which provide visible and
legitimate evidence of ‘better’ risk culture, also contain the seeds for further disappoint-
ment and calls for further reform. And if institutional complexity is ‘real’, we should
expect it to continually reassert itself despite the simpliﬁcation strategies of organiza-
tional actors.
NOTES
[1] The IIF is a global association of ﬁnancial institutions, providing research and analysis, networking
opportunities and developing proposals that inﬂuence the public policy debate.
[2] The FSB is an international body that brings together senior policy makers from key ﬁnancial centres to
monitor the global ﬁnancial system and to coordinate the development of regulatory, supervisory and
other ﬁnancial sector policies.
[3] In 2013, the responsibilities for ﬁnancial sector regulation were split between the Financial Conduct
Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) of the Bank of England. The FCA’s role
includes protecting consumers and promoting competition between providers of ﬁnancial services.
[4] Email communication (December 2014).
[5] Email communication (May 2013).
[6] Field notes from unrecorded meeting (September 2015).
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